My focus in this chapter is predominantly on South Africa (especially in the sections on legislation and environmental justice), but this does not mean that the change in attitude I am pleading for is similarly geographically circumscribed. Notwithstanding the extraordinary tribal and ethnic diversity on the African continent, Southern African traditional beliefs and worldviews are similar to beliefs and worldviews in other parts of Africa, which arguably enables the concerns raised in this chapter to resonate far beyond South Africa’s borders. Although South Africa has one of the most liberal constitutions in the world and a progressive Bill of Rights (and is Africa’s flagship in this regard), it does not go so far as to extend *locus standi* (or legal standing), let alone rights, to individual animals. This is despite widespread and systematic campaigning for the inclusion of animal rights by animal rights groups during the negotiating process for South Africa’s Constitution. South African legislation, like virtually all legislation in sub-Saharan Africa, continues to be characterised by a resolutely anthropocentric approach (see also note 4). Is this anthropocentrism a hangover from the colonial and apartheid eras, in other words, a characteristic of occidental scientific objectification and exploitation? Or is it already implicit, or indeed explicitly contained, in traditional African world views and perceptions? Zimbabwean novelist Chenjerai Hove denies this. He asserts that Africans have neither catalogued nature nor pinned it down and preserved it in formaldehyde; rather they see nature differently and speak to and about it differently (quoted in Grill 2003:363).

Arguably, Hove is right about one issue. It seems fair to say that practices such as large-scale testing of products on living animals, vivisection, dissection and generally scientific experimentation involving non-human animals appear to have been pioneered and exported all over the globe largely by ‘Westerners’ driven by monetary motives. The same goes for factory farming, the mass slaughter of animals for food, and the hunting and killing for profit or recreation of large numbers of non-domestic animals (with modern aberrations such as ‘canned hunts’). Of course, this subjugationist and expansionist attitude and drive claimed countless human victims, too – which may explain the accusations made by or on behalf of indigenous people, Africans, Native Americans and Australian aboriginal people.
But is Hove correct when he claims that Africans see nature differently and speak to and about it differently? The investigation of the grounds for this claim takes up the first part of this chapter. My primary focus will be on South Africa, as (arguably) one of the more enlightened countries on the continent with regard to the treatment and consideration of non-human animals. Yet, many of the views and attitudes held in South Africa are indeed representative of African perceptions per se, as I will show in the course of the chapter.

Traditional African perceptions – *Isilwane: The animal*

One of the most detailed and richly illustrated accounts of traditional African perceptions of, and interactions with, the non-human world is furnished by Zulu traditional healer and popular historian Credo Mutwa in his book *Isilwane: The animal*, where he emphasises that in the past, Africa – people did not regard themselves as superior to animals, birds, fish and trees:

> They were all seen as part of ourselves, and nature was contained both within and without us. [Mutwa] castigates the arrogance of modern Western society, which has taken dominion over the earth … People in the modern Western world have separated almost everything: white and black, man and woman, and they believe that we are separate from the Earth. (Ian Player, Foreword, in Mutwa 1996:9–10)

Mutwa (1996:11) takes issue with what he refers to as the ‘strange world of separatism’ of ‘Western civilization’, ‘a world in which things that really belong together and which ought to be seen as part of a greater whole are cruelly separated’. He considers the ‘most dangerous and destructive view by far – one which has changed human beings into rampaging, destructive and mindless beasts’ to be that ‘man is superior to all other living things on earth, and that he was especially created to be overlord and custodian of all things, animate and inanimate’ (Mutwa 1996:11–12). But are the traditional African world views really that different from this ‘dangerous and destructive view’? It would appear to be so, at least given Mutwa’s (1996:13) testimony:

> We must take a great spiritual step backwards. We must adopt the view of creation that was not only held by ancient Africans but also by Native Americans and many other people of the ancient world: that creation is one great and beautiful whole, one revolving sphere … and to be viewed from all sides as one things instead of a number of shattered fragments…

He continues:

> In old Africa we … believed that we had nature within and beyond ourselves. By making us believe that the highest gods were part animal and part human being, we were taught to look upon animals with great reverence, love and respect. … The native people of Africa regarded them as a blessing from the gods – as something unbelievably sacred and vital for the continued existence of human beings. Black people believed that animals were the blood of the earth and that as long as there were migrations criss-crossing the country, human existence on Earth was guaranteed (Mutwa 1996:13–15).
Apart from drawing attention to co-existence, mutual dependence and a sense of unity, Mutwa invokes the moral imperative of respect. A significant reason for respecting animals may be that they actually embody deceased human beings. ‘One of the important pillars upon which the traditional religion of African people rests is a belief in reincarnation and transmigration of souls … the belief that when you die, you are reincarnated immediately after death as that type of animal which your people regard as their totem’ (Mutwa 1996:17). Other reasons for respecting animals have more to do with human survival and ecological awareness:

Africans did not hunt animals for fun. They were hunted for food and for religious reasons … The African people know, just as the native American people knew, that if you would destroy the environment, you will ultimately destroy the human race (Mutwa 1996:19).

What are we to make of Mutwa’s account? He rejects the unwarranted scepticism of most whites and rejects the labels of ‘superstition and fertile imagination’ (Mutwa 1996:31). Yet, in what follows, examples of ‘superstition and fertile imagination’ abound. ‘Cats guard against “alien creatures”’ like the tokoloshe and mantindane1 (Mutwa 1996:32), he asserts. Bones of dogs are to be used in bone-transplant operations on humans, based on the belief that God created dogs especially to save human beings. As a corollary to this assumption, the maltreatment of dogs is believed to cause illness and disease (Mutwa 1996:45). Moreover, he assures us, ‘African people have a deep love and respect for poultry’, because of the ‘medicinal and magical purposes’ for which it can be used, such as for use in combating misfortune, aphrodisiacs, celebrations and the like (Mutwa 1996:56). Such ‘love’ and ‘respect’, however, is not extended to intensively reared and kept poultry. ‘Battery hens are regarded as soulless, lifeless creatures because they lay eggs which have not been blessed by the seed of the cock and are sterile’ (Mutwa 1996:61; emphasis mine). Like poultry,

goats are believed to be born to be sacrificial animals. Their purpose in life is to serve human beings and to protect them with their lives. For this reason, a goat must be treated with the utmost respect and reverence (Mutwa 1996:63).

Surely, ‘utmost respect and reverence’ would involve treating goats as valuable in and for themselves? These are all examples of superstitious anthropocentrism and indeed – in the case of the battery hens – bias against female animals. Is it not humans who rob battery hens of their life and ‘soul’ by rearing and keeping them in batteries, and finally killing them? This initial failure to assume moral responsibility makes it extremely easy to reject other obligations of love and respect for animals.

Mutwa (1996:66) explicitly rejects the charge of irrationality:

Bestiality and satanism have nothing to do with these rituals contrary to what certain white anthropologists have concluded. This gross misrepresentation merely displays abysmal ignorance.’
Yet, the list of ritual practices continues, without as much as a rational explanation, including Mutwa’s account of medical considerations. ‘Sheep are used for ceremonial and healing purposes – for instance, combating madness with half-cooked fresh sheep’s brains and … boiled freshwater fish’ (Mutwa 1996:69–70). Plausibly enough, cattle are regarded as indicators of wealth, used in gambling, sport and economic transactions. Mutwa (1996:75–79) cites the traditional practices and customs of lobola, or ‘bride wealth’, and ‘cattle banking’, as well as fines in cattle being used as a means of meting out punishment, insofar as retribution for one’s transgressions could be expected in cattle.

Mutwa (1996:20) reports that, ‘although African people kept livestock in the form of cattle, sheep, goats and chickens, they were sometimes forced by necessity to go into the wilds in search of animals whose skins could be used for blankets, bags and items of attire.’ Although the implication here appears to be that ‘livestock’ did not matter in the same way as non-domestic animals, the custom of ‘respectful use’ (and concomitant conferral of instrumental status as ‘wildlife resources’) clearly extends to free-living animals:

In olden days, waterbuck were greatly respected by our people, and their horns were used as the snouts for bellows which were used by blacksmiths … When a waterbuck was killed for its horns, a ceremony of apology was performed over the carcass (Mutwa 1996:173).

Such ceremonies turn out to be of no benefit to the animal in question but are in the sole interest of human beings, who wish to avoid punishment by the Creator or by the ancestors. Given Mutwa’s account, the ‘value’ of, and basis of ‘respect’ for, non-domestic animals – like domestic animals – is manifestly determined by their function in the lives of human beings, their purpose and the use to which they are put by human beings, more often than not guided by superstition.

Trinidad-born travel writer and novelist V.S. Naipaul paints an especially stark picture of the treatment of other-than-human animals on the African continent, in his account of his travels through Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon and South Africa. About his time in Uganda he writes, ‘Africans who are great relishers of what they call “bush meat” … given guns and left to themselves, would easily eat their way through the continent’s wildlife’ (Naipaul 2010:62). There is a manifest hierarchy of organic existence, which is a common feature of African ethical traditions (Horsthemke 2015:41–43):

In forest belief [among the people of Gabon] the organic world, the world that mattered, was like a pyramid. [According to one prominent interviewee, lawyer and lecturer in political anthropology Rossatanga-Rignault,] The first level is the minerals and ore, the second levels are the trees and the flora, and the third level the animals. The fourth level are the human beings (Naipaul 2010:225).

‘Africans’, Naipaul (2010:254–255) reiterates, ‘like the French and the Chinese and the Vietnamese, ate everything, not only elephants and dogs and cats, but everything else with life … The eating of bush meat had become a cultural matter; it was not to be questioned’.

In Ghana too, he says, there are not many free-living animals left: ‘the people … had eaten much of it out’ and had now taken to eating cats and dogs: ‘In the north they ate and loved dog; they called it “red goat”. In the south they ate cat and had almost eaten them out’
Naipaul (2010:174) adds, ‘The bush was almost barren of wildlife, but these people were managing to squeeze out the last remnants, while their fertile land remained largely unused’.

This impression is also reinforced in Côte d’Ivoire:

Africans eat everything that Nature provides (except when a particular animal is the totem of a tribe or clan) [including] bats … Cats [too] were eaten; they were part of the bounty of nature, and they could be reared to be killed. … You put them in a sack of some sort and then you dropped the sack in a pot of boiling water. The very thought of this everyday cruelty made everything else in the Ivory Coast seem unimportant (Naipaul 2010:213–214).

Naipaul (2010:211) considers it ironic that Côte d’Ivoire, the land of ivory next to Ghana’s land of gold, ‘is now without the elephants that by their deaths provided the ivory of their tusks’:

The land is full of cruelty, which is hard for the visitor to bear. From the desert countries to the north long-horned cattle are sent for slaughter here in ramshackle trucks, cargoes of misery, that bump along the patched and at times defective auto route to Abidjan, to the extensive abattoir area near the docks. … When sights like this meet the eye of simple people every day there can be no idea of humanity, no idea of grandeur … (Naipaul 2010:212–213).

A special sense of disappointment is reserved for South Africa. After visiting a witchdoctors’ market, with its numerous stalls of animal remains, Naipaul (2010:284) voices his initial expectation that the ‘big struggle’ South Africans had been engaged in ‘would have created bigger people, people whose magical practices might point the way ahead to something profounder. It was impossible for any rational person to feel that any virtue could come from the remains of these poor animals’.

Behind the Hector Pietersen memorial, which commemorates the first death among youth at the hands of the apartheid police during the 1976 Soweto youth uprising, Naipaul (2010:319) noticed ‘a stall selling animal skins. I was sorry to see it. I thought this trade had been outlawed in South Africa …’

Throughout his book, Naipaul is concerned with something he deems deeply puzzling, indeed disturbing: how those who had (have) been at the receiving end of so much exploitation, oppression and injustice - that is, who were ‘othered’ by their not being white - could inflict equivalent evil on others, on living and sentient individuals who are ‘othered’ by their not being human.

Ubuntu / botho / hunhu and non-human animals

Among indigenous Americans, the view that all life is interconnected is expressed in the Lakota phrase ‘Mitakuye oyasin’ and in the Cree concept of ‘wakkohtowin’ (‘All is related’, ‘We are all related’), both of which refer to the self in relation, the self defined relationally. In sub-Saharan Africa, the relevant view would be that expressed by ubuntu
HORSTHEMKE

(an isiZulu term for shared or common humanity, or humanness); equivalent concepts are *botho* or *hunhu* in seSotho and chiShona, respectively, or *ukama* (a Shona concept that emphasises the interrelatedness of humans, the environment, God and the ancestors). The basic idea is that the individual and her well-being depend on the community, understood here as a ‘web of relationships’ (Sitoto & More 2002:55). Striking similarities can also be detected between *ubuntu* and the ancient Egyptian idea of *maat*, which emphasises harmony, righteousness, and the need to locate and understand oneself and one’s actions ‘in the context of the larger whole’, something that ‘has great significance for both social and environmental ethics’ (Karenga 2004:181).

There have been various attempts in recent years to employ *ubuntu* / *botho* / *hunhu* (Ramose 2002:325–326; Ramose 2009:309, 312) as a locus for ‘fostering human respect for the environment’, as an orientation ‘towards balance and harmony in the relationship between human beings and the broader be-ing or nature’, and as ‘an expression of interconnectedness between people themselves, and between people and the biophysical world’ most notably – and respectively – by South African (or South Africa-based) academics Malegapuru Makgoba (1996: 23), Mogobe Ramose (2002: 326), Catherine Odora-Hoppers 2005: 4–5 and Lesley Le Grange (2012: 63). ‘Humanness’ (*ubuntu, botho* or *hunhu*), Ramose (2009:309) explains,

regards being, or the universe, as a complex wholeness involving the multi-layered and incessant interaction of all entities … The principle of wholeness applies also to the relation between human beings and physical or objective nature. To care for one another, therefore, implies caring for physical nature as well. Without such care, the interdependence between human beings and physical nature would be undermined. Moreover, human beings are indeed an intrinsic part of physical nature although possibly a privileged part. Accordingly, caring for one another is the fulfilment of the natural duty to care for physical nature too. The concept of harmony in African thought … conceives of balance in terms of the totality of the relations … between and among human beings, as well as between human beings and physical nature [emphasis mine].

Are Ramose, Makgoba, Odora-Hoppers and Le Grange correct? Following the exposition given above, Ramose (2009:312) refers chiefly to ‘human dignity’ and our pertinent duties and decisions. *Ubuntu* states that a person becomes a person through other persons: ‘I am because we are’. Or, in other words, a human being depends on human beings to be a human being: *Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*, or *Motho ke motho ka batho*, or *Munhu munhu navhanhu*. It would seem that the purported concern for non-human nature and the environment could be fostered only on the basis of human benefits and would, therefore, not amount to any acknowledgement of the non-instrumental value of nature or of the environment. Nor could the principle in question furnish a basis for ‘respect’ for, or a ‘harmonious relationship’, with members of non-human species. In other words, the primary and immediate beneficiaries of such a relationship or ‘respect’ must be human beings, whether as agents or recipients. In fact, in focusing exclusively on human beings, *ubuntu* is by definition anthropocentric, as is the slogan *batho pele* – ‘people first’. Odora-Hoppers (2008:30) explicitly acknowledges this: ‘Relationships between people hold
pride of place, expressed in the various philosophies across Africa and best captured by the African concept of ubuntu' (see also Odora-Hoppers 2005:3). The essay of slain Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko (2004:46), exploring certain African cultural concepts, expresses a similar, anthropocentric-relational concern:

We regard our living together not as an unfortunate mishap warranting endless competition among us but as a deliberate act of God to make us a community of brothers and sisters jointly involved in the quest for a composite answer to the varied problems in life. Hence in all we do we always place Man first and hence all our action is usually joint community oriented action rather than the individualism which is the hallmark of the capitalist approach.

At best, then, the principle(s) in question yield what is generally referred to as an ‘indirect-duty view’ or an account of ‘indirect concern’ for other-than-human animals. Our duties and obligations regarding other animals cannot be ‘to’ them, because they lack the prerequisite humanness. Yet, insofar as the maltreatment of these creatures may have an impact on our dealings with human beings (that is, it may make us insensitive in our interactions with fellow humans), as well as on the feelings of other humans (to whom we have direct duties on the grounds of our shared humanity), it is advisable that we refrain from mistreating animals. Again, this is advisable not because of any duties to animals – who, after all, exist only as part of ‘physical or objective nature’ (Ramose 2009:309), that is, (by implication) lacking in mental life and ‘subjectivity’. Speaking of our ‘duties’ to them (even of our ‘natural duty to care’, following Ramose) is only a roundabout way of referring to our actual duties to human beings. It follows that ubuntu does not, indeed cannot, concern animals directly – obviously not as moral agents, but not as moral recipients either. I do not, therefore, share the view of Wits University librarian and animal rights activist Michelé Pickover (2005:171) that ‘[a]nimal liberation is … a natural progression of our humanity, embodying the powerful concept of ubuntu’ (see also Pickover 2009).

South African educational philosopher Moeketsi Letseka (2000:186) has, perhaps unintentionally, revealed the gulf that exists between ubuntu and concern for animals:

Consider … the case of an offence on which everyone agrees that it is heinous and an affront to botho or ubuntu, such as repeatedly raping an 80-year-old grandmother or a six-year-old girl. To express their displeasure community folk might utter statements like: “He is not a person but a dog” [or] “Oh God, he is an animal”.

The controversial move of comparing rapists to animals like dogs might be excused as unreflectingly reporting a popular perception, but it arguably points to something deeper – the view that animals occupy a territory untouched by ordinary moral concerns and considerations: indeed, an amoral realm.
Perhaps it is ungenerous to focus exclusively on *ubuntu* – which constitutes an improvement on egoism but is still decidedly anthropocentric (see Prozesky 2009:301) – as exemplifying African ethical attitudes towards animals. According to moral theorists like Bénézet Bujo (from the Democratic Republic of Congo), Munyaradzi Felix Murove (Zimbabwe) and Martin Prozesky (South Africa), and – following them – Le Grange, Africa has additional conceptual resources that might help answer questions regarding direct ethical responsibility for non-human nature, resources that involve an extension of the traditional ideas of ‘relatedness’ and ‘relationality’. Whereas Bujo emphasises African holism, ‘solidarity with creation as a whole’ (Bujo 2009:284) and ‘cosmic community’ (Bujo 2009:296), Murove 2009:315–316 and Prozesky 2009:302 draw on the concept of *ukama* originating in Zimbabwe (see also Le Grange 2012:61–62).

According to Bujo (2009:281), human health and self-realisation is crucially dependent on ‘peaceful coexistence with minerals, plants and animals’. In order to make sense of the seeming absurdity of ‘peaceful coexistence with minerals’ (and even with plants, arguably), perhaps ‘peaceful’ should be understood to mean ‘non-exploitative’. Yet, we learn that ‘effective healing’ (‘reconciliation with the cosmos’), as it is practised and modelled by the African traditional healer, requires not only embracing ‘the community of the living and the dead but also natural elements such as animal bones, teeth and hair, plants, pieces of wood and minerals’ (Bujo 2009:284). And indeed: ‘Animals, plants and minerals and other inanimates are the forces made available by God as vital energy for use by human beings’ (Bujo 2009:290; emphasis added). It would appear, then, that the notions of ‘cosmic community’ and of the relationality of all life, and of holism *tou court*, remain perfectly compatible with a largely instrumental view of other-than-human nature.

What about *ukama*? Unlike *ubuntu*, this concept ‘asserts that a person can only be a person in, with and through not just other people [those who are still alive as well as ancestors] but also in, with and through the natural environment’ (Prozesky 2009:302). As Murove (2009:316) explains, *ukama* (meaning ‘relatedness’)

> is a Shona word implying relationship and an understanding of reality in terms of interdependence. Grammatically *ukama* is an adjective constructed *u-kama* … *Kama* becomes a word meaning to milk a cow or goat. In Shona thought the idea of milking suggests closeness and affection.

Significantly, the ‘closeness’ in question derives from an animal being utilised, first and foremost, for human ends and purposes. Indeed: ‘*Umuntu* [man] is always in need of others and these others, as suggested in *ukama*, also imply the natural environment’ (Murove 2009:324). Just insofar, one might add, as the ‘natural environment’ (which may be taken to include animals) meets and satisfies *umuntu*’s needs – personal, cultural or other. Murove (2009:316) continues:
In its adjectival form, *ukama* means being related or belonging to the same family. However, in Shona, as in many other African languages, the meaning of *ukama* is not restricted to marital or blood ties. This culture tends to see all people as *hama* (relatives).

‘All people’ effectively excludes other-than-human animals and the environment. Therefore, any non-anthropocentric orientation that Prozesky (and Murove himself) perceives in African ethics appears to be illusory—not properly founded. Similarly, Le-Grange’s (2012:62) assertion that ‘the idea of oneness of humans with nature expressed in Arne Naess’s … deep ecology, and the notion of wholeness of the earth expressed in James Lovelock’s *Gaia* … have resided among African peoples for many centuries through notions such as *ukama*’ is rather misleading in that it contains a false analogy. Neither Naess’s nor Lovelock’s concepts or ethics are human-centred—unlike *ukama*.

Even if this judgement appears too harsh, an additional and significant question concerns *umuntu*’s actual responsibilities with regard to other-than-human nature. The mere moral injunction to ‘harmonise [humanity’s] behaviour with the natural environment’ (Murove 2009:329) does not tell us much about *umuntu*’s concrete, specific responsibilities and duties. In fact, such ‘harmonisation’ could be—and indeed has been—considered compatible with, perhaps even to require, rituals of animal slaughter such as the bare-handed killing of bulls (see also note 6), for the sake of ‘good relations’ between *umuntu* and *amadlozi* (ancestors), and even ‘future generations’. Insofar as *ubuntu* and *ukama* have any action-guiding content at all, this is unlikely to have any primary, immediate beneficiaries other than human beings.

### Animals and environmental law in South Africa

Moving beyond traditional African perceptions and attitudes and into the ‘new South Africa’, what—if any—legal provisions have been made for the welfare and protection of non-human animals? In his foreword to the book *Environmental Law in South Africa* by South African Professor of Law, Jan Glazewski, the then Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Mohammed Valli Moosa, states:

> With the new Constitution we have divested ourselves of the burden of the apartheid past and put in place a democratically elected government. Our future is based on a conceptual bedrock which aims to rebuild an open and democratic society based on human values of dignity, equality and freedom (Glazewski 2000:v).

Given the progressive nature of South Africa’s new Constitution and Bill of Rights, do these ‘values of dignity, equality and freedom’ in any way apply beyond or outside the human realm—that is, to non-human individuals?

Glazewski (2000) points out that an anthropocentric approach is implicit in the legal system, particularly in those legal norms that underpin emerging environmental law norms. ‘Environmental management must place people and their needs at the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, developmental, cultural, and social interests equitably’ [National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, S 2 (2)]
Contrasted with an anthropocentric approach is ‘biocentrism’, and a ‘specific form of biocentrism is animal-centred ethics which enjoins the moral effect of our actions on individual animals not on species … What happens to species is only of indirect concern insofar as it affects individual animals’ (Glazewski 2000:8).

‘A traditional stumbling block for litigants wishing to bring actions on behalf of the animate or inanimate environment’, according to Glazewski (2000:17), ‘has been the requirement that a litigant must have legal standing or locus standi’. South Africa’s new Constitution ‘relaxes the locus standi requirement considerably, and it is much easier now for a litigant to bring an action on another’s behalf and in the public interest’ (Glazewski 2000:440; emphasis mine). However, the ‘courts have been prepared to recognise the locus standi of animal rights groups to bring actions on behalf of animals well before the requirement was relaxed by the Constitution’ (Glazewski 2000:8). As an example, Glazewski (2000:148) cites the following case:

[I]n Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Standerton v Nel and Others [1988 (4) SA 42 (W)] … the court dismissed the argument that the appellant, the SPCA, lacked locus standi to bring an interdict to prevent the holding of a rodeo which was to include a bull-riding competition. It held that ‘… it would be an anomalous situation if the law required that the SPCA had to stand idly by and wait for an act of cruelty to be performed before being entitled to take any steps in the matter’ [47 D-E]. The Constitution has however considerably relaxed the locus standi requirement … Thus individuals or non-governmental organisations may now approach a court to bring an action in the public interest [emphasis mine].

It is worth noting that ‘the public interest’ (see also Glazewski 2000:440) is essentially an anthropocentric notion.

Referring to the widespread and systematic campaigning by animal rights groups for the inclusion of animal rights in South Africa’s Constitution, Glazewski (2000:423–434) suggests that, ‘[r]ather than including animal rights, [the] demands [by animal rights groups] could have been accommodated to some extent by incorporating a duty on people to treat animals humanely’. What would such ‘humane treatment’ amount to? Humane slaughter, humane experimentation, humane mass production and transportation? According to Glazewski (2000:424),

this focus on animal rights conforms with international trends: globally there has been ever increasing attention being paid to the topic of animal rights as well as the ethical treatment of animals … These ethical concerns have manifested both internationally and locally in concern for the humane treatment, prevention of cruelty and the unnecessary killing of animals.

These formulations evidently leave an interpretation of what is seen to count as ‘humane treatment, prevention of cruelty and the unnecessary killing of animals’ wide open.

To be fair, animals in South Africa have not been and are not wholly without legal protection. Yet, legislation – then as now – has included nebulous ideas like ‘prevention of cruelty’:
The relevant South African legislation, the Animals Protection Act 71 of 1962, the Performing Animals Act 24 of 1935, and the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act of 1993, was developed primarily as a concern for domestic rather than wild animals, covering for example the treatment of dogs, but also includes wild animals within their ambit (Glazewski 2000:425).

Glazewski (2000:439) continues:

The long title of the [Animal Protection] Act [71 of 1962] states simply that its object is to prevent cruelty to animals. While the Act was undoubtedly formulated with domestic animals in mind, the definition of ‘animal’ includes wild animals, birds and reptiles as well … The core provision contains extensive prohibitions on the maltreatment of animals and makes such action a criminal offence subject to a fine and or imprisonment. [S 2(1), especially S 2(1)(a)-(s)] [emphasis mine].

There are other examples of legal inadequacy around formulation and classification:

The South African legal system unfortunately does not follow the logical scientific classification in regulating exploitation and conservation of marine mammals. Thus the law regulating whales is tucked away in regulations made under the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 … while the seals are grouped with sea birds in the Sea Birds and Seals Protection Act 46 of 1973 (Glazewski 2000:465).

Significantly, a ‘relevant issue which was considered during the debate about the inclusion of an environmental clause in South Africa’s Bill of Rights was whether environmental rights should be extended to inanimate objects such as animals and plants’ (Glazewski 2000:80; emphasis mine). The rejoinder is obvious: How can an ‘animal’ be ‘inanimate’? Glazewski (2000:80) reports that it

was pointed out by some that slaves, women, and other groups at one time did not enjoy rights but that civilised society has now extended fundamental rights to these groups. Some argue that animals, being sentient beings, should similarly be accorded such rights. These arguments did not however find favour.

Glazewski (2000:425) himself does not consider the argument for the extension of animal rights to wildlife … altogether unrealistic if one considers that at one time both slaves and women were considered to be rightless entities. In the context of South Africa’s political transformation, however, now is probably not an appropriate time to consider wildlife rights … It is predicted that in the longer term more firmly established legal norms will be developed in the context of inanimate objects.

Yet, just as ‘straight’ South Africans feel threatened by the extension of equal rights (like marriage rights) to gays and lesbians, or men by the granting of equal rights to women, has no bearing on the necessity of this extension, so does the fact that South Africans feel threatened have no bearing on the necessity and desirability of the extension of rights to animals – who, after all, have more in common with humans than with plants and
‘inanimate objects’. (On the feasibility of constitutional protection for individual animals, see Bundesministerium press release 2001; Hooper 2002:2.)

The lack of direct legal concern and consideration with regard to animals continues to be astonishing. Some time ago, a South African municipal newspaper, the Randburg Sun, carried a report of the increasing trend of shooting and killing loeries and other birds with pellet guns. ‘Although one does not need a licence for a gun below a certain muzzle velocity, if caught the culprit can be charged with discharging a firearm in a built-up area’ (8 July 2005:1; emphasis mine).

In two provocative papers (Bilchitz 2009a; Bilchitz 2009b), South African legal scholar David Bilchitz argues that since the South African Constitution fails to protect animals (qua group ‘unable to assent to its terms’), ‘it is in some sense illegitimate’. In order to remedy this omission, and to establish the Constitution’s legitimacy in this regard, he suggests the provision of protection ‘through drawing out the implied meaning of the provisions that already exist’, even though ‘a constitutional amendment would be the most desirable route in expressly protecting animals’ (Bilchitz 2009b). The solution favoured by Bilchitz is to recognise animals as ‘(natural) persons’ (as opposed to mere ‘things’) and to establish as a first measure towards the ‘progressive realisation’ of their entitlements ‘something like the Five Freedoms developed by the UK Farm Animal Welfare Council: freedom from thirst and hunger, freedom from discomfort, freedom from pain, injury and disease, freedom to express normal behaviour, [and] freedom from fear and distress’ (Bilchitz 2009b:n.51).

In his response to Bilchitz, Johannesburg-based American philosopher Thaddeus Metz (2009) takes issue with the claim that it is at present ‘not possible’ to enforce full constitutional protection for animals in South Africa. Metz (2009) argues that it may not even be desirable, at present or in the future, to curb traditional cultural practices that involve the eating, ritual slaughter and wearing for ornamentation of animals.

To interpret the Constitution in a way that forbids these practices, even if subject to progressive realization, is … not merely to fail to uphold African cultural practices, but also to judge them negatively and suppress them even more. And since there is a weighty duty on the state to make up for the losses of culture it was responsible for in the past, perhaps Constitutional Court justices have all things considered reason not to add to what might reasonably be judged to be still more Eurocentrism at the highest level of law.

Taking the view I am defending (and which Bilchitz may endorse), if a particular practice is morally dubious (in that it violates the lives, dignity and integrity of individuals), it ought not to be protected legally – quite the opposite, in fact. The fact that indigenous South Africans have suffered certain cultural losses under apartheid should not give them constitutional carte blanche in respect of all their cultural practices and traditions. Consider polygamy, circumcision practices and the like (not to mention witchcraft practices): where ‘preservation of culture’ comes at such a price, it does not merit endorsing. Indeed, where African cultural practices involve ‘the torture of animals’ (to use Metz’s words), like the ukweshwama ritual, constitutional amendments or interpretations of constitutional law such as envisaged by Bilchitz are both desirable and justifiable. These practices are not obviously different from the ritual killings and harvesting of human body parts involved...
in what is known as ‘muti murder’ – both in terms of the superstitions that underlie these practices and their gruesomeness.⁷

Environmental justice

Anthropocentrism characterises not only traditional African perceptions and worldviews and the South African legal system; it also pervades post-apartheid environmental politics, explicitly so. David McDonald (2002:3) is a political economist and geographer who has been working in the area of urban infrastructure and environmental justice in South Africa since the early 1990s:

> At its core, environmental justice is about incorporating environmental issues into the broader intellectual and institutional framework of human rights and democratic accountability … [It] is unrepentantly anthropocentric in its orientation – placing people, rather than flora and fauna, at the centre of a complex web of social, economic, political, and environmental relationships.

Belinda Dodson (2002:83), a specialist in environmental and geographical science, concurs:

> Most definitions of environmental justice are resolutely anthropocentric … Indeed this anthropocentrism is one of the major criticisms of environmental justice by environmentalists of a more bio- or eco-centric persuasion. It is this very characteristic, however, which allows environmental justice to be incorporated into bills of rights and national constitutions, as in the case of South Africa, and which permits it to be linked to other movements for social equality, such as feminism.⁸

That the adoption of an anthropocentric agenda may be politically expedient is not in doubt. A more pertinent question to answer is whether it is ethically defensible. In order to address this question, it is necessary to examine the notion of justice as it has been employed on the African continent. Inspired by the claim of Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984:171) that ‘the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life’, the consideration that ‘in African cultures … the dignity of the community is more important than the dignity of a mere individual’ and that ‘morality is a function of experience and communal rationality’, Zimbabwean academic Fainos Mangena (2012:8) maintains that, in the communitarian cultures of sub-Saharan Africa, ‘justice does not reside in the individual – it resides in the community of which the individual is part’. Here, the ‘ideas of reason, spirit and desire … exist as assets of the community and not [as in Platonic terms] as elements that make up an individual’. Menkiti (1984:176) contends that according to African conceptions of person and community, personhood is not the sort of thing one is born with, that it ‘has to be attained, and is attained in direct proportion as one participates in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one’s stations’. Since an individual ‘comes to deserve the duties of justice … only through possession of a capacity for moral personality … morality ought to be considered as essential to our sense of ourselves as persons’, that is, ‘as a fundamental part of what it
means to be a person’ (Menkiti 1984:176). This, in essence, is an African version of what has become known as ‘justice-as-reciprocity’ (see Horsthemke 2010:112–122; Horsthemke 2015:121) or ‘justice-as-mutuality’ – it is essentially related to the power of ‘persons’ (see also Shutte 1993:54ff).

Articulated in this way, the notion of justice embraced here excludes not only animals but also those humans lacking in the allegedly relevant capacities, who are not (yet) ‘persons’. Menkiti (1984:173) is quite candid about the (relative) deficiency in moral personality (and even status) of those in the early stages of ‘ontological progression’, in other words, infants and young children. For one thing, he notes a ‘natural tendency in many languages … of referring to children and new-borns as it’ (Menkiti 1984:173). At least ‘we have the choice of an it for referring to children and new-borns, whereas we have no such choice in referring to older persons’ (Menkiti 1984:174). However, this is

not just a distinction in language but a distinction laden with ontological significance. In the particular context of Africa, anthropologists have long noted the relative absence of ritualised grief when the death of a young child occurs, whereas with the death of older persons, the burial becomes more elaborate and the grief more ritualised – indicating a significant difference in the conferral of ontological status (Menkiti 1984:174).

A similar (possibly even more serious) problem is posed by those more or less permanently deficient in moral personality, that is, those who cannot and will never be able to participate in communal life, to contribute to the common (human) good – to reciprocate, as it were. ‘Justice-as-reciprocity’ is deficient in important respects in that it cannot accommodate these individuals.

A conception of justice as ‘subject-centered’ (see Horsthemke 2010:135–139; Horsthemke 2015:121), on the other hand, is able to account for the extension of considerations of justice, and for the ascription of rights, beyond the class of persons in Menkiti’s sense. According to subject-centred conceptions of justice, basic moral considerations governing justice and rights are grounded not in an individual’s capacity to reciprocate, to participate in communal life or to contribute to the common good (although this may certainly be a significant consideration at a secondary or non-basic level), but rather in other features of the individual herself, for example her needs and her welfare. When Archbishop Desmond Tutu (2013:xv) mentions ‘other issues of justice’, he takes these to apply not only to human beings but also to ‘the world’s other sentient creatures’ (Tutu 2013:xv). ‘Even when faced with human problems’ that ‘fight for our attention in what sometimes seems an already overfull moral agenda’, we ought not to ignore ‘instances of injustice’, that is, ‘the abuse and cruelty we inflict on other animals’.

Concluding remarks

Over the past few decades, there has been a noticeable trend away from a purely anthropocentric agenda in European politics (see Nussbaum 2006:392, 449n.57, 449n.60, on developments in Austria, Italy and Germany, and Bilchitz 2009b, on developments within the European Union and in Israel), culminating in Spain’s recognition of the ‘equal
rights’ of the great apes. In 1989, the (West) German Green Party adopted a ‘Proclamation of Fundamental Animal Rights’, which argued that the ‘principle of justice demands that like be treated alike, and unlike be treated unlike. All living creatures must therefore be treated equally in respect of those aspects in which they are equal’. The Proclamation affirmed that animals ‘have a right to life, to protection from human violence, a right to freedom from invasive experiments, and a right to appropriate habitat’. Although it stopped short of demanding the total abolition of animal-based agriculture, vivisection and the keeping of animals in captivity, it did include provisions that would limit such practices to circumstances in which the animals could reasonably be viewed as participating in their own choice (The Animals’ Agenda, November 1989:37). In 2002, the German lower legislature voted overwhelmingly in favour of amending the German Constitution so as to offer protection to animals. In fact, Germany banned conventional poultry battery cages from 2007 – five years earlier than had been required by a European Union Directive, and prohibited enriched poultry cages from 2012. Switzerland was the first country to ban battery cages with effect as of 1 January 1992. In India the Central Zoo Authority, has issued orders on behalf of the government, to ban the keeping of elephants in zoos, after successful legal proceedings against their use in circuses (see Nussbaum 2006:325, 343). Africa – and even her ‘flagship’ country South Africa – appears to be lagging far behind in terms of traditional customs, practices, values, legislation and the environmental movements spawned) – on an issue that, as Milan Kundera (1984:289) puts it in his novel *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, may well constitute the ‘fundamental test’, the ‘true moral test’, of a nation, culture or society, ‘its attitude towards those who are its mercy: animals’.

Notes

1. The *tokoloshe* and *mantindane* are feared mythical creatures that seem to have both human and non-human characteristics. Mutwa provides exhaustive descriptions in both instances – but this makes them no more ‘real’ than meticulous descriptions of unicorns, centaurs, elves and trolls attest to the reality of these creatures.
2. I would even go so far as to say, contra Le Grange (2012:63), that *ubuntu* is speciesist. Animals and the biosphere are necessarily defined in terms of human ends and purposes. It may be true that *ubuntu* ‘helps us to appreciate … that the self is inextricably bound up in relations with the other and the biophysical world’ (Le Grange 2011:10) – but then the master, however benevolently, is also inextricably bound up in relations with his slaves.
3. In this regard, see Metz (2012) and Metz (2014).
4. On the lack of requisite or desirable legislation, regarding the use of animals in scientific research, science education and ‘livestock production’, see Nyika 2009 (Tanzania and elsewhere), Kimwele et al. 2011 (Kenya), Masiga and Munyua (2005) (Africa, generally) and Mangena (2013) (Zimbabwe and Africa, generally).
6. The *ukweshwama* ritual takes place annually as part of the First Fruits Festival in KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa) and involves the barehanded killing of a bull by a group
of young Zulu warriors. It is traditionally performed to ensure that the Zulu nation has a strong army to defend its king and his subjects.

7. Take, for example, the cases of muti murder and the use of human body parts that Oliver Becker (2007) has reported about and analysed in considerable detail. There are at least three distinctive types of superstition that pervade these practices (and these beliefs that are held not only by the practitioners but by the majority of the population of sub-Saharan Africa): (1) that this kind of muti (or ‘medicine’) works, (2) that the vocalisation of the dying victim – which expresses his/her ‘life essence’ – enhances the power of the ‘medicine’ that is ideally taken from the (still) living person; and (3) that the discovery of the body (after the requisite parts, bones or organs have been removed, and the victim has commonly been left to bleed to death) secures additional effectiveness.

8. At this juncture, we may consider the account by Farieda Khan, a long-time researcher in the field of South African environmental history, regarding the problems facing ‘acceptance and implementation of environmental justice’ in South Africa as well as the view that the bastion of tradition in South Africa has not only been anthropocentric but also has been resolutely androcentric (and, indeed, has anti-feminist features) (Horsthemke 2010: section 3.3). Khan (2000:42–43) writes that the acceptance and implementation of environmental justice has not been a smooth process, nor has it been without conflict, given the persistent legacy of a conservation ideology which rates the survival of endangered indigenous fauna and flora above that of the poor. The persistence of this legacy may clearly be seen in the following responses to animal rights issues. The first is from the representative of a poor rural community, who stated, ‘I strongly caution the animal rights groups that they do not colonise our minds. Gone are those days. It would be better if you aim your ideals towards the balancing of animal rights and human rights’ (Makuleke 1997). The second statement is extracted from a newspaper editorial which gave voice to the feelings of many people when it criticised the moral priorities of a society in which far more publicity, public sympathy, and support followed an exposé of the abuse of young elephants than ever greeted the many instances of torture and murder of human beings, most of them poor and black: ‘Those facing the brutality of everyday existence find it difficult to feel strongly about animal suffering … The animal rights lobby might gain even more widespread support for their cause if they were at least as active in voicing their protest against cruelty to people (Sunday Argus 10 July 1999). Three comments may be made in response to the scenario presented by Khan, comments that also address the community representatives’ concerns. First, consistency in one’s concern for animals’ rights requires commitment to the rights of humans. They are not mutually exclusive but, on the contrary, part of the same moral fabric. Second, public outcry against abuse, cruelty, torture and murder is characteristically fuelled by putting a face and (where available) a name to individual victims of violence and brutality, irrespective of whether they are human or non-human. Faceless and nameless crimes do not generally elicit publicity, public sympathy and support. Third, cautions like those of Makuleke (see above; Makuleke 1997; Khan 2000:43) have also been directed at feminist and women’s rights groups. Are objections to polygamy, virginity testing and female genital excision also examples of mental colonialism and hegemonism? I suggest here that one can be a consistent opponent of both social injustice and questionable cultural beliefs and practices.
References


Odora-Hoppers, C.A. 2008. ‘Culture, language, indigenous knowledge and the role of universities in sustainable rural development’, Proceedings of the conference hosted by the Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD) and held at the Kopanong Conference Centre in Johannesburg, 6–7 March, Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD), Braamfontein, pp. 29–35.


